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LIMITING LIABILITY:
ROMAN LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
DAVID JOHNSTON*
I. INTRODUCTION**
This Article concerns vicarious liability in Roman law, and, in
particular, the various ways in which that liability might be limited.'
The general principle in Roman legal thought was that there should
be no liability for others: Gaius writes that "our condition can be
made better but not worse through our slaves"; 2 a fortiori, it could not
be made worse by those who were not members of the family. That
general statement was made with reference to contractual obligations
only, and is not true of delict. But, even in contract various bases of
liability for others were established. These bases always were subject
to limits, no doubt to make the inroads into principle seem more
tolerable.
This introductory section sketches out the main contexts in which
vicarious liability arose, and the three main modes of limiting it.
These contexts are considered more fully in Sections II to V. Section
VI makes some selective rather than systematic observations about
the use of the various different modes of limiting liability in later legal
history.
The first two models of limited liability appear in the context of
contract. There, the general principle, as already noted, is that there is
no liability for the actions of others. The notion of obligation is per-
sonal: a contract binds the parties to it, but not normally any third
party, even one who may have one of the contracting parties in his
power (potestas). This principle, however, is modified in two ways,
each of which involves liability within limits. First, the actio de peculio
could be brought against a paterfamilias on account of an obligation
* Regius Professor of Civil Law, University of Cambridge, and Fellow of Christ's College.
** This Article uses the following abbreviations. C = Justinian's Code; D = Justinian's
Digest. Both of these sources are in the standard edition of the Corpus iuris civilis edited by Th.
Mommsen and P. Krueger. SZ = Zeitschrift der SavignyStiftung fir Rechtsgeschichte (this is a
German legal-history periodical); RIDA = Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquitd.
1. The most recent comprehensive discussion of liability for others is R. Kntltel, (1983) 100
SZ 340-443.
2. Gaius 8 ad edictum provinciale D. 50.17.133: melior condicio nostra per servos fieri
potest, deterior fieri non potest.
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entered into by a slave or a son subject to his power. In this case, a
creditor could have recourse against the paterfamilias - not to the
full extent of the debtor's obligation - but only up to the maximum
of the amount in the peculium. The peculium was a fund of property
that remained the property of the paterfamilias and could be revoked
by him, but over which the person in power had been given charge,
and with which he could effectively deal as if it were his own. It was
also necessary to determine which acts did, and which did not give rise
to a claim against the peculium.
Second, the general principle was modified by the availability of
two similar actions, the actiones institoria and exercitoria. The first al-
lowed a claim against a "principal,"' 3 a person who had placed an
"agent" (an institor) in charge of a business, for acts done by him in
the course of the business; the second allowed a claim against a ship-
owner (exercitor) for the acts of the ship's captain.4 Here, the institor
or captain could be entirely free, or a person in the power of a paterfa-
milias, or a slave, but in any of these situations, liability was not lim-
ited by a financial sum.5 Instead, the circumstances in which liability
could arise at all were restricted by the terms of appointment (prae-
positio) of the institor or captain: in modem terms, by the authority
given by the principal to the agent.6 In contrast to the peculium limit
on liability, this approach may be called a "functional" mode of limit-
ing liability. With later commentators, this rule of liability without a
financial limit found little favor. Grotius thought the actio exercitoria a
most unhealthy innovation, principally because the shipowner's liabil-
ity was not subject to any financial limit.7 Grotius's unfavorable reac-
tion prompts us to consider what factors, if any, mitigated the strict
rule of unlimited liability which might otherwise, as he suggests, oper-
ate as a deterrent to commerce.
3. Sometimes, it is convenient to use the terms "principal" and "agent." But, it is not
intended that they should bear any connotations from the modem law of agency. In particular,
the terms should not be taken to imply that an agent contracting on behalf of a principal does
not become bound personally.
4. For a recent historical discussion of the institor, see J.-J. Aubert, Business managers in
ancient Rome (Leiden, 1994) and for the development of the law, see A. Wacke, (1994) 111 SZ
280-362.
5. If the institor or captain was a slave in power and had a peculium, it was disregarded for
the purposes of determining the principal's liability to these actions, unless (which is hard to
imagine) the principal was ignorant that the business was actually being carried on: see G. Pug-
liese, (1957) 3 Labeo 308-43 at 325-26.
6. In this respect there is a resemblance to another action, which ought to be mentioned
for the sake of completeness: the actio quod iussu. There, the paterfamilias authorized an act by
a member of his family and became liable himself in full. The difference is that this action was
available only where there was that status relationship; the present actions are not so restricted.
7. H. Grotius, De iure bei ac pacis (ed. used: Blaeu, Amsterdam, 1646) 2.11.13.
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The third mode of limiting liability appears in the context of de-
lict, where the broad principle was that there was no liability for the
actions of others unless they were in one's own power. Exceptions to
this rule are referred to later (Section IV). For those in power (de-
pendent children or slaves), however, a different regime applied: the
paterfamilias was liable for their delicts. But his liability was noxal: as
an alternative to paying damages he could surrender the wrongdoer to
the plaintiff. Accordingly, the liability of the paterfamilias was limited
by the value of the wrongdoer.
II. A CTIO INSTITORIA AND EXERCITORIA
The principle underlying these two actions is that a principal was
liable without limit for the actions of his agent, the institor or magister
navis. Here, the liability arose out of contracts between the agent and
a third party. If the institor was a free person, then he would be bound
by the contract; the actio institoria simply offered an additional rem-
edy-an alternative defendant from whom the creditor could attempt
to recover. 8 If the institor was a slave, there would be no personal
liability, and the actio institoria against the principal would be the only
remedy. In either situation, however, there was no financial limit on
the liability of the principal. In later times, as we have seen, this result
was regarded as a fundamental flaw. It is easy to see the lack of at-
traction to the principal of unlimited liability for the actions of his
agent, when the very fact of delegation to the agent makes the close-
ness of personal supervision difficult.
Yet, to protest too much about the lack of a financial limit on
liability is to ignore the functional limit which restricted the circum-
stances in which the principal's liability arose in the first place. Ul-
pian, in his discussion of the actio institoria, states that "not every
transaction with an institor binds the person who appointed him, but
only if the contract was made on account of the business to which he
was appointed, that is, to the extent of the appointment." 9 There are
many similar statements in relation both to the institor and to the
ship's captain; and elsewhere Ulpian remarks that the praepositio, the
appointment, sets the terms for the contractors, stating that an agent
who goes beyond these terms does not bind his principal (modum
8. Ulpian 28 ad edictum D. 14.1.1.17; 63 ad edictum D. 15.1.44; bringing one of the claims
to court will, however, consume both. On terminology, cf. note 3.
9. Ulpian 28 ad edictum D. 14.3.5.11: non tamen omne quod cum institore geritur obligat
eum qui praeposuit sed ita si eius rei gratia cui praepositus fuerit contractum est, id est dumtaxat
<ad> id [ad] quod eum praeposuit.
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egressus non obligabit exercitorem).1° Furthermore, the principal had
the option to reduce the scope of, or avoid, a liability that would
otherwise arise by giving express notice to parties contracting with his
agent; there is a certain amount of discussion about what language
such notices must be in, and how large and visible they must be."
What is most significant, however, is that the effectiveness of this limit
on the principal's liability depends on the stringency with which the
appointment is interpreted. In other words, the disadvantages of the
lack of a financial limit on liability can be mitigated considerably ac-
cording to the strictness of the interpretation applied to the terms of
the appointment. Two Roman texts concerning loans offer guidance
in this area.
First, it is important to be clear about what form the creditor's
action should take. A creditor suing for repayment of a loan would
bring a condictio. In this case, the condictio would be modified to
account for the loan being made to the institor rather than to his prin-
cipal. The formula for such an action is reconstructed by Lenel as
follows: "If it appears that Lucius Titius, who was put in charge of a
business by the defendant, ought on that account to give 10,000 sester-
ces to the plaintiff, let the judge condemn the defendant to pay that to
the plaintiff; if it does not appear, let him absolve."'1 2 In formula, as
far as the functional limit on the liability of the principal for his institor
is concerned, the key words are "on that account" (eius nomine); how
strictly were they interpreted?
Ulpian 28 ad edictum D. 14.3.13 pr. reads as follows:
Someone had a slave in charge of an olive oil business in Aries, and
the same slave in charge of borrowing money. The slave had bor-
rowed money, and the creditor, thinking he had done so for the
business, sued with the present action. He could not prove that the
slave had borrowed the money for the business. Although the ac-
tion was extinguished, and the creditor could not sue again on the
basis that the slave had also been put in charge of borrowing money,
none the less Julian says he has an actio utilis.13
10. Ulpian 28 ad edictum D. 14.1.1.12; cf. D. 14.3.5.15; 14.3.11.5; C. 4.25.2 (222).
11. Ulpian 28 ad edictum D. 14.3.11.2-6.
12. 0. Lenel, Das Edictum perpetuum (3rd. ed., Leipzig, 1927) 264: si paret Lucium Titium,
qui a No No tabernae instructae praepositus est, eius rei nomine Ao Ao HS X milia dare
oportere, eius iudex Nm Nm Ao Ao condemna, si non paret absolve.
13. Habebat quis servum merci oleariae praepositum Arelate, eundem et mutuis
pecuniis accipiendis: acceperat mutuam pecuniam. putans creditor ad merces eum ac-
cepisse egit proposita actione: probare non potuit mercis gratia eum accepisse. licet
consumpta est actio nec amplius agere poterit, quasi pecuniis quoque mutuis ac-
cipiendis esset praepositus, tamen lulianus utilem ei actionem competere ait.
[Vol. 70:1515
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What has to be envisaged here is that in the action the creditor
made reference to the oil business (merx olearia), and pleaded that on
that account (eius nomine) he had advanced money to the slave. But
because he failed to prove this, he lost. This result indicates the strict
interpretation of the words eius nomine: the creditor must show that
the loan was made for the purposes of the business over which the
slave was praepositus.14 The requirements of proof, however, are left
rather unclear: is the creditor required to prove that the slave actually
spent the money on buying oil, or simply that he had good reason to
think that the slave would? Or, was there any reference in the con-
tract dealing with the purpose of the loan? All these questions are
unfortunately left obscure; but some of them are clarified in a text
dealing with the actio exercitoria.15
Africanus 8 quaestionum D. 14.1.7 pr.-2 reads as follows:
Lucius Titius appointed Stichus captain of a ship. He borrowed
money and stated in the contract that he had received it for repairs
to the ship. The question arose whether Titius would only be liable
under the actio exercitoria if the creditor proved the money had
been spent on repair of the ship. He replied that the creditor could
successfully sue if, when the money was lent, the ship was in a con-
dition such that it required repair: for it is not proper for the credi-
tor to be compelled personally to take charge of repairing the ship
and carrying out the owner's business, which would certainly be the
case if he had to prove that the money was spent on repair: what is
required is that he knows he is lending for a purpose a captain has
been placed in charge of, which certainly cannot happen otherwise
than if he also knows that money is needed for repair: so although
the ship was in a condition such that it required repair, if much
more money was lent than was necessary for that, an action ought
not to be given for the full amount against the shipowner. [1] Some-
times it must even be considered whether, in the place where the
money was lent, the thing on account of which it was lent can be
acquired: for what, he says, if someone has lent money for purchase
of a sail on an island on which there is absolutely no sail to be had?
In sum, the creditor must show a certain diligence in this matter. [2]
Much the same is to be said, he says, if the question is about the
actio institoria: there too the creditor ought to know that purchase
of the goods is necessary, and that the slave has been put in charge
of purchase. It is enough if he lent for that purpose, and not also
necessary that he should himself take care whether the money was
spent on that thing. 16
14. Cf. C. 4.25.1 (212) and C. 4.25.5 (294), where the creditor is required to prove that the
institor had authority to borrow money.
15. For further discussion of points in this text not dealt with here, see Pugliese, op. cit.
(note 5) 318-20.
16. Lucius Titius Stichum magistrum navis praeposuit:
1995]
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Here Africanus, reporting Julian, is concerned with what the
creditor must prove to be able to claim repayment of a loan from the
shipowner. The main propositions are: the creditor must prove that
the loan was made for a purpose falling within the terms of the cap-
tain's appointment (praepositio), and that the loan was necessary for a
purpose falling within the appointment. But, the creditor need not
prove that the captain actually spent the money for that purpose. The
narrow reading of the appointment emerges from this reasoning: the
creditor will not know that he is lending for a purpose within the ap-
pointment unless he knows that the money is needed for some such
purpose. So, it is not enough for the creditor that the borrower is
indeed the captain of a ship, appointed to manage it by a shipowner.
Instead, the creditor must also know that there is a purpose within the
appointment that justifies lending the requested amount. In practice,
this means that the creditor can recover from the exercitor only if he
has satisfied a rather stringent duty of inquiry, although the duty is
one that can be satisfied on the spot. The extent of this duty of in-
quiry is perhaps surprising given that, according to Ulpian, the reason
for the actio exercitoria (more pressing in the case of ships than of
other businesses) was that transactions with captains were sometimes
urgent and left no time for investigation of the credit-worthiness of
the captain himself.17
It is important to be clear that the liability of the principal does
not turn on enrichment; and it is essentially that line of reasoning
which is excluded by the jurist in saying that the creditor need not
concern himself with how the money was actually spent. If this proof
was a prerequisite of the principal's liability, then there would be good
is pecuniam mutuatus cavit se in refectionem navis earn accepisse. quaesitum est an non
aliter Titius exercitoria teneretur quam si creditor probaret pecuniam in refectionem
navis esse consumptam. respondit creditorem utiliter acturum, si cum pecunia creder-
etur navis in ea causa fuisset ut refici deberet. etenim ut non oportet creditorem ad hoc
adstringi ut ipse reficiendae navis curam suscipiat et negotium domini gerat, quod certe
futurum sit si necesse habeat probare pecuniam in refectionem erogatan esse, ita illud
exigendum ut sciat in hoc se credere cui rei magister quis sit praepositus, quod certe
aliter flieri non potest quam si illud quoque scierit necessariam refectioni pecuniam
esse: quare etsi in ea causa fuerit navis ut refici deberet, multo tamen maior pecunia
credita fuerit quam ad earn rem esset necessaria, non debere in solidum adversus
dominum navis actionem daft. (1) interdum etiam illud aestimandum an in eo loco
pecunia credita sit in quo id propter quod credebatur comparari potuerit. quid enim,
inquit, si ad velum emendum in eiusmodi insula pecuniam quis crediderit in qua
omnino velum comparari non potest? et in summa aliquarn diligentiam in ea
creditorem debere praestare. (2) eadem fere dicenda sit et si de institofta actione
quaeratur: nam tunc quoque creditorem scire debere necessariam esse mercis compara-
tionem cui emendae servus sit praepositus et sufficere si in hoc crediderit, non etiam
illud exigendum ut ipse curam suscipiat an in hanc rem pecunia eroganda est.
17. D. 14.1.1 pr.
[Vol. 70:1515
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reason to say that the ground for liability was that a benefit had been
in rem versum of the principal; in other words, that he had been en-
riched at the creditor's expense. But it is clear from Julian's discussion
that matters do not go this far: all that is required is that the amount
lent be necessary for a purpose within the authority of the captain.
Accordingly, it is perfectly possible for there to be liability even
though the shipowner is not enriched (if for example the captain ab-
sconds with the money or gambles it away).18 It follows that the liabil-
ity of the shipowner is indeed a matter of contract. Moreover, it is
notable that in this contract the creditor bears a strict duty of inquiry,
and correspondingly, a heavy onus of proof in the action.
How can this be explained? It seems most likely that the jurist
was eager to confine this remedy, the actio exercitoria (and indeed the
actio institoria), within clear limits. This remedy broke with the funda-
mental principle of privity of contract, and it exposed a principal to
liability without financial limit. Consequently, it was important that
the departure from the well-established rule be kept within strict
bounds, and that the creditor be able to have recourse against the
principal only when he had done all that he reasonably could do to
satisfy himself that the loan was being made for a purpose necessary
for the principal's business. So, in spite of the heavy burden imposed
on the creditor, and the likely impracticability of discharging this bur-
den in a case of urgency, the jurist may have thought that this ap-
proach represented a reasonable balancing of the interests of principal
and creditor. In later times, the demise of the strict Roman insistence
on privity of contract disturbed this delicate equilibrium. As will ap-
pear in Section VI, attention then turned to another type of limitation
on liability, this time of a financial nature.
III. A CTIO DE PECULIO
The actions previously discussed concerned the actions of free
persons as well as slaves: what mattered was the terms of the praeposi-
tio rather than the status of the parties. These are actions based on
relations of contract. By contrast, the present action was available
only in respect of the actions of a person under the power (potestas) of
a paterfamilias, that is, his slaves or children. This action is based on
relations of status. The amount recoverable in the action was limited,
as already noted, to the value of the peculium. But valuation of the
18. This is the reason for the different approach taken by Ulpian 29 ad edictum D. 15.3.3.9
in discussing the actio de in rem verso: there liability must be founded on actual enrichment.
1995)
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peculium was not quite a straightforward matter. The paterfamilias
was able, when sued de peculio by a creditor, first to deduct any sums
"owed" (in a loose sense) by the peculium to him to establish the ac-
tual extent of the fund.19 This special position of the paterfamilias re-
flected that as a matter of law he was still owner of the peculium.
It is often said that any act of a slave or son who had a peculium
would bind the paterfamilias, subject only to the limit of the value of
the peculium.20 But, so far as slaves are concerned, this view goes too
far. While the peculium did place a financial limit on liability, and that
was without doubt its main significance, it is equally clear that in the
case of slaves there also was a functional limit on liability: not every
act of a slave would bind the paterfamilias. In this connection, the
jurists use the terms causa peculii or (once) utilitas peculii as a touch-
stone of those cases in which liability can be brought home to the
paterfamilias. The following passage illustrates this situation, as well
as the different position of the son in power.
Ulpian 29 edictum D. 15.1.3.5-6, 9 states:
If a son in power or slave has guaranteed a debt or otherwise stood
surety or mandated payment, the question arises whether there is an
actio de peculio. The better view is that in the case of a slave the
ground for the guarantee or mandate must be examined, which is a
view approved in the case of guarantees by slaves by Celsus in book
6. If therefore the slave has interceded as a surety, not carrying on
the business of the peculium, the owner will not be liable de peculio.
[6] Julian too writes in book 12 of his digesta that, if a slave has
given a mandate for payment to my creditor, it is relevant what the
ground for the mandate was: if he mandated payment on behalf of
his own creditor, the owner is liable de peculio; but if he performed
the function of a surety, the owner is not .... [9] But if a son has
become guarantor or surety, the question arises whether he binds
the father de peculio. The correct opinion is that of Sabinus and
Cassius, who thought a father was always liable de peculio and that
this was a difference from the case of slaves. 21
19. Gaius, Institutes 4.73; Ulpian 29 ad edictum D. 15.1.5.4 and 9.3.
20. M. Kaser, Das rOmische Privatrecht (2nd. ed., Munich, 1971) I 606.
21. Si filius familias vel servus pro aliquo fideiusserint vel alias intervenerint vel
mandaverint, tractatum est an sit de peculio actio. et est verius in servo causam
fideiubendi vel mandandi spectandam, quam sententiam et Celsus libro sexto probat in
servo fideiussore. si igitur quasi intercessor servus intervenerit non rem peculiarem
agens, non obligabitur dominus de peculio. (6) Iulianus quoque libro duodecimo diges-
torum scribit, si servus mandaverit ut creditori meo solveretur, referre ait quam causan
mandandi habuerit: si pro creditore suo solvi mandavit, esse obligatum dominum de
peculio: quod si intercessoris officio functus sit, non obligari dominum de peculio....
(9) sed si filius fideiussor vel quasi interventor acceptus sit, an de pecuio patrem obli-
gat quaeritur. et est vera Sabini et Cassii sententia existimantium semper obligari pa-
trem de peculio et distare in hoc a servo.
[Vol. 70:1515
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These texts demonstrate that a guarantee given by a slave did not
invariably give rise to liability on the part of his owner subject only to
the limit of the value of the peculium. Rather, it might not go to the
peculium at all. The test whether it did is expressed in various ways,
but use of the term causa predominates: Celsus says that what is rele-
vant is the causa of the guarantee; Julian agrees, here and elsewhere; 2
2
Papinian speaks of the utilitas peculii.23 Gaius, discussing the rele-
vance of a guarantee by a slave in the case of a pact not to sue, reports
Julian's view that there can be an action against the slave's owner de
peculio if the slave had a iusta causa intercedendi (for example because
he owed that amount to the principal debtor).24 Elsewhere Sabinus
speaks more precisely, of liability if the guarantee was given in rem
domini or ob rem peculiarem: if it concerned the owner's own business
or the business of the peculium.25
The case of sons in power is different, as the last section of the
passage quoted above shows: in these cases liability always existed,
irrespective of the causa of the transaction. The reason for this result
is that a son in power had the capacity to enter into obligations and
was bound himself as a matter of civil law, ius civile, even though he
might not have funds of his own. In the present case, therefore, his
guarantee was a valid guarantee at civil law. It would have been open
to the jurists to hold that, in spite of that, it did not bind his paterfamil-
ias, owing to a lack of causa. But, the jurists appear to have preferred
the view that liability of the one entailed liability of the other. This is
in accordance with their general approach: father and son are liable
for the same debt, the son's liability being as principal debtor, the fa-
ther's being similar to that of a surety, here a surety by implication of
law. 26 Following this approach, if the son's contract was valid, the
question of causa did not arise.27
Thus, the peculium presents two modes of limiting the paterfamil-
ias' liability. The pure case is the case of sons, where the only limit on
liability is the financial one: all that needs to be done to establish the
22. Julian 4 ex Minicio D. 46.1.19: a contrast between a guarantee ex causa peculiari and
one extra causam peculii.
23. Papinian 8 quaestionum D. 46.3.94.3.
24. Gaius 1 ad edictum provinciale D. 2.14.30.1.
25. Paul 4 ad Plautium D. 15.1.47.1
26. See W.W. Buckland, The Roman law of slavery (Cambridge, 1908) 212, 215.
27. The passage immediately following that quoted above, D. 15.1.3.10-11, speaks of actions
by the son that would not give rise to an action against his paterfamilias. It seems most likely
that here the jurists are thinking of actions in relation to the son's military peculium (peculium
castrense), where the father did not come under any obligation and accordingly was not liable to
defend any action: see Maecianus 1 fideicommissorum D. 49.17.18.5.
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limit on the paterfamilias' liability is to value the peculium. In the case
of slaves, however, the financial limit applies in the same way, but
there is the further limitation that liability will occur only in certain
circumstances. Consequently, in the latter case, there are elements of
a functional, and of a financial limit. To modem eyes, this is the most
unusual of the various modes of limiting liability: it does not depend
on any delegation of a particular function or authority (which might
be expected in some way to set limits on the liability), nor does it
depend purely on relations of status (where liability for those of that
status might be expected to be unlimited). Rather, it depends on the
revocable grant of a fund of property to a person who stands in a
certain relationship of status to the paterfamilias. Accordingly, com-
merce and status are intertwined. But the impression of a commercial
arrangement is somewhat dispelled because the fund of property still
belongs to the paterfamilias, is still freely revocable, and can only be
granted to those of a certain status.
IV. DELICTUAL LIABILITY
Here there are two regimes to consider. First, there is liability for
those who are not members of the family, and who stand in no rela-
tion of status to the principal. In this case, the general principle is that
there is no liability whatsoever for their wrongdoing. Of course, this
general rule has exceptions. The notable exceptions are two of the
quasi-delicts: the strict liability of shipowners, innkeepers, and st-
ablekeepers for loss sustained by their customers on the premises, and
the strict occupier's liability for objects thrown from a building into a
public place. 28 Although these are not insignificant, they are excep-
tions which prove the rule; they are qualifications of the general prin-
ciple introduced on policy grounds.29
It is widely believed that the liability in these cases was not based
on fault, but on public policy, and statements in the Digest support
this theory.30 Indeed, the references in the texts to the basis of liabil-
ity being fault or a presumption of fault have been attacked as unclas-
sical.31 But for present purposes it is enough to note that this is a class
28. For literature see R. Zimmermann, The law of obligations (Cape Town, 1990) 16-18.
29. Cf Grotius, De iure belli acpacis 2.17.20, noting that a liability for others in the absence
of personal fault is not a rule of the ius gentium, nor a general rule of ius civile, but one intro-
duced against sailors and certain others for special reasons, ex rationibus peculiaribus.
30. D. 4.9.1.1; D. 9.3.1.1.
31. But see the defense by Knfltel, op. cit. (note 1) 344f.; G. MacCormack, (1971) 18 RIDA
525-51.
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of case in which a principal bears liability for the acts of independent
third parties. Both actions give rise to a claim for damages for double
the loss sustained by the plaintiff;32 the principal's liability for that
claim is unlimited.
Although in the case of innkeepers and shipowners the principal's
liability derives from his operation of a certain type of business, there
is no real discussion in the Roman sources restricting the principal's
vicarious liability to cases where harm is caused in the course of his
business (i.e. the functional limit on liability). That restriction seems
rather to have been taken for granted, and its boundaries never ex-
plored. Therefore, little material existed for exploitation by later legal
theorists. Almost all we find is that in the case of shipowners, the
relevant loss must be sustained on board the ship.33
The second delictual regime is liability for members of the family,
namely the children and slaves in the power of the paterfamilias. The
paterfamilias was liable for their delicts, and (subject to what follows)
there was no functional or financial limit on this liability. But rather
than paying damages for the delict, the paterfamilias had the option of
surrendering the wrongdoer to the plaintiff: noxal surrender. (This
system died out for children, but was retained for slaves.) Accord-
ingly, the liability of the paterfamilias for the delicts of those in his
family was limited by the value of their persons. This point (though
doubtless not the origin of noxal liability) was appreciated during the
classical period: Gaius writes that "it would be inequitable that the
misconduct [of sons and slaves] should involve their parents or mas-
ters in loss going beyond their own persons." 34 The matter can be put
more generally for the case of slaves: the owner's liability could not
exceed the value of the piece of property giving rise to the liability. In
later times, as we shall see, that general proposition found broad
application.
32. W.W. Buckland, A textbook on Roman law (3rd. ed. by Peter Stein, Cambridge, 1963)
598-99.
33. Ulpian 18 ad edictum D. 4.9.7. pr.: si in ipsa nave damnum datum sit. Since this text
comes from book 18, it was evidently originally concerned not with receptum, the title in which it
now appears, but with the quasi-delictual action. Equally, so far as the receptum itself is con-
cerned there appears only the bland statement that innkeepers and others are liable only if they
have undertaken safekeeping of property in the course of their business: Ulpian 14 ad edictum
D. 4.9.3.2: exercentes negotium suum; ceterum si extra negotium receperunt, non tenebuntur.
34. Gaius Inst. 4.75: erat enim iniquum nequitiam eorum ultra ipsorum corpora parentibus
dominisve damnosam esse; cf Just. Inst. 4.8.2.
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V. SOME PROVISIONAL REFLECTIONS
The last three sections prompt some general reflections. But first
a few words are required on one Roman legal institution which con-
tributes less than might be expected to the notion of limited liability:
the contract of mandate. There is no doubt that this contract gave rise
to considerations about whether the actions of the mandatary were
within or in excess of the terms of the mandate. 35 But the discussion
in the Digest about acts in excess of a mandate is very limited (far
more limited than that concerning the actiones institoria and ex-
ercitoria), and its influence on subsequent legal thought in this context
appears to be correspondingly slight. In part, this limited treatment
may be because of the eventual acceptance that the mandatary still
could enforce the terms of a mandate he had exceeded, provided he
was prepared to bear personally any expenses which went beyond the
mandate. 36 That rule blurred the clear edges of the notions of limited
authority under a mandate, and of the limited liability of the
mandator.
So far, we have seen that the Roman sources present three differ-
ent modes of limiting liability, two in the case of contract, one finan-
cial and one functional, and one-a financial one-in the case of
delict. Of the two variants on financial limits on liability, the noxal one
is the purer: there is a straightforward equivalence between the value
of the wrongdoer and the limit on liability. This liability differs from
the case of the peculium, where there is a fixed maximum liability, but
because (in the case of slaves) the question of causa peculii may arise,
there is no certainty that any given act will bind the principal. To that
extent, the peculium model represents a hybrid, with elements of both
a functional and a financial limit.
In the law of delict, there is no trace of any developed functional
limit on liability and, special cases apart, the cases simply divide into
those where vicarious liability cannot arise and those where it can.
Where it does arise, it is a liability that depends on relations of status,
and is subject to a financial limit.
In the law of contract, a financial limit on liability was available
only in the case of slaves and children in power. In other words, it
required a relationship of status between what one would otherwise
call "principal" and "agent." Where free persons were concerned, the
only limit recognized on contractual liability was a functional limit
35. Paul and Gaius D. 17.1.3.2-5.4; 41.
36. Compare Gaius, Institutes 3.161 with Justinian's Institutes, 3.26.8.
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(praepositio), which could also apply to slaves and sons in power. If a
slave or son in power was running a business, then in principle either
limitation on liability could apply. What limitation applied in a given
case, however, depended on the paterfamilias' relationship with the
business. The texts make it clear that there was liability de peculio
even if the paterfamilias had no idea what his slave or his son was
doing; on the other hand, there was liability to the actio exercitoria or
institoria only if the principal had actually placed the agent in charge
of the business, thereby showing his intention that the agent could
operate the business. 37 It is evident the Roman jurists thought it ap-
propriate to refer to the paterfamilias' intentions in determining
whether there was a financial limit on his contractual liability. In
adopting this approach, the jurists granted the paterfamilias considera-
ble flexibility in arranging his business affairs and the liability that
might arise from them.
VI. LATER DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN MODELS
What was the fate of these three different models of limiting lia-
bility? This Article only attempts to give some impression of the
evolution of law by the adoption of one rule, adaptation of another,
and rejection of a third. Moreover, this impression is limited to a
number of jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in part
because the effect of their own approach to these questions can still be
felt in various modern systems of law. Therefore, although this discus-
sion is not comprehensive, as a matter of the history of substantive
law, it can nonetheless illustrate the methodologies of later jurists in
redeploying Roman materials.
A. The Law of Delict and the Functional Limit
Against the Roman background already sketched out, it comes as
a surprise to find the functional limit on liability characteristic of the
actio institoria creeping into the law of delict. Johannes Voet, in vol-
ume I of his commentary on the Digest states that, as an institor binds
his principal in contracting, he also binds his principal by committing a
delict in the office to which he has been appointed. Voet also cites
various passages from the Digest, to which we turn in a moment.38
37. See, e.g., Justinian's Institutes 4.7.2-4; see recently T. Chiusi, Contributo allo studio
dell'editto de tributoria actione (Rome, 1993) 387-89 on the trichotomy ignorantia (actio de pecu-
lio); scientia (actio tributoria); voluntas (actio institoria).
38. J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (edition used: vol. I: Verbessel, Leiden, 1698; vol.
II: de Hondt, The Hague, 1704) 14.3.4: "porro, ut institor contrahendo praeponentem obligat, ita
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Elsewhere, in dealing with noxal actions, Voet points out that "mas-
ters and fathers are liable in full for delicts of their servants (famuli)
and sons committed in an office or position to which they were ap-
pointed by the father or master, even if no wage, or an amount of
wages much smaller than the delictual liability is due to the servant;39
since it is to be imputed to the father or master that he employed the
work of negligent or wrongful persons in a certain office or
position." 40
In France, a similar extension of the contractual principle of func-
tional liability into the sphere of delict has been laid at the door of
Domat.41 This idea is based on his discussion in book I of Les loix
civiles dans leur ordre naturel of what might loosely be called contrac-
tual agency. Domat discusses the case of the institor and ship's cap-
tain, citing several passages from the relevant Digest titles, and argues
that agents, "commis" and other "pr6posez" represent their principals
within their sphere of authority, so that the act of the agent is that of
the principal. He continues, "they are obliged to ratify transactions
made with their commis. So too they are liable for the actings, fraud,
and deception of their pr6posez. ' '42 This last remark, however, must
be read in a very narrow context: book I is concerned only with con-
tract; "crimes et dlits" are not discussed within Domat's work at all;43
and liability for negligence, Aquilian liability, is addressed else-
where." The key to Domat's concerns is provided by one of the Di-
gest texts to which he refers, in which Ulpian states that the exercitor,
rather than the creditor must bear the loss if a ship's captain cheats on
the price of goods he buys. 45 The context of Ulpian's text is not alto-
et delinquendo in officio cui praepositus est..." citing D. 14.3.5.8 and 9; D. 9.2.27.9; D. 39.4.3; C.
9.27.1.
39. The limit on liability by reference to unpaid wages does not appear to owe anything to
Roman law, although it bears a slight similarity to rules relating to noxal liability. It is referred
to in the Sachsenspiegel 2.32, and that tradition rather than the Roman one is the more likely
source for Voet in this passage. See T.B. Barlow, The South African law of vicarious liability
(Cape Town, 1939) 31-32, 60-64.
40. Voet, Commentarius 9.4.10... quoties illi deliquerunt in officio aut ministerio, cui a
patre dominove fuerunt praepositi; cum his imputandum sit, quod negligentium aut malignorum
operas ministerio certo aut officio addixerint; citing D. 4.9.7 pr., 4 and 6; D. 9.2.27.9; D. 39.4.1 pr.,
6 and 12.1-2; D. 47.5.1; D. 48.3.14 pr.
41. M. Planiol, Revue critique de la l6gislation et de jurisprudence 38 (1909) 282-301.
42. J. Domat, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel (edition used: Nicolas Gosselin, Paris,
1713) 1.16.3. no.1: "Ainsi ils sont obligez de ratifier ce qui a dtd trait6 avec leurs commis. Ainsi,
ils r6pondent du fait, du dol, et des tromperies des personnes qu'ils ont prepos6es."
43. Introductory section to title 2.8, "Des dommages causez par des fautes qui ne vont pas a
un crime ny a un delit."
44. Op. cit., 2.8.4 no. 1.
45. Ulpian 28 ad edictum D. 14.1.1.10: sed et si in pretiis retum emptarum fefellit magister,
exercitoris erit damnum, non creditoris.
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gether clear, but it appears46 that the captain borrows money for the
purchase of goods, having misled the creditor as to their true cost; the
captain converts the money not actually required to buy the goods to
his own use; and the jurist holds that the exercitor can still be sued by
the creditor for the full amount lent and therefore bears the loss. Ac-
cordingly, Ulpian's, and in all probability, Domat's discussions, are ac-
tually concerned not with the general question of the liability of an
employer for the delicts of his employees within the scope of their
employment, but with the question whether the creditor satisfied his
duty of inquiry so as to allow him to bring the actio exercitoria for the
full amount lent.
Nonetheless, in France, views similar to those of Voet are ac-
knowledged by Pothier. In his TraitM des obligations, he states: "It is
not only in contracting that employees bind their employers. A per-
son who has entrusted another with a certain function is responsible
for the delicts and quasi-delicts which his employee has committed in
the exercise of the functions for which he has been employed.
47
From the perspective of Roman law, it is the reliance that Pothier
places on D. 14.3.5.8 to justify imposition of vicarious liability in delict
on an employer (commettans) that is interesting. This same text was
relied upon by Voet for the same purpose. It bears closer
examination.
Ulpian 28 ad edictum D. 14.3.5.8 states:
He [Labeo] says that if an undertaker had a slave for cleaning
corpses who robbed a dead body, an actio quasi institoria should be
given against him, although both an action for theft and an action
for insult would lie.
48
Here, there are concurrent actions because the slave has evi-
dently removed something from the body. Consequently, he has not
merely committed the delict of iniuria by his wrongful interference
with the body, but the delict of theft; there is no difficulty in allowing
two delictual actions where the same act founds liability for both de-
licts. Furthermore, there is said to be an actio quasi institoria, which
one would (at least at first sight) assume to be a contractual action
directed at the undertaker on the basis of the slave's contract. Since
46. This is consistent with what has already been said about the creditor's duty of inquiry.
47. "Ce n'est pas seulement en contractant que les priposds obligent leurs commettans.
Quiconque a commis quelqu'un h quelque fonction est responsable des ddlits et quasi-d6lits que
son pr~pos6 a commis dans l'exercice des fonctions auxquelles il dtoit pripose." R.J. Pothier,
Traite des obligations § 453 (ed. used: Oeuvres, Paris, 1768, vol. III) citing D. 14.3.5.8.
48. Idern ait, si libitinarius servum pollinctorem habuerit isque mortuum spoliaverit,
dandam in eum quasi institoriam actionem, quamvis et furti et iniuriarurn actio competeret.
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there has been no personal breach of contract on the part of the un-
dertaker, one would not expect a "direct" contractual action to lie
against him.
49
There has been much discussion about the fact that the jurist al-
lows not an actio institoria, but only an actio quasi institoria.50 For the
present, what matters is that the availability of one action or the other
indicates that there is a transaction, a negotium, between the slave and
the person who asked for the body to be cleaned; and that the slave
can therefore be said to be either an institor proper or else a quasi
institor. From this assumption, it follows that liability to the actio
(quasi) institoria will be liability of the undertaker to an actio locati
with formula institoria, the damages being the locator's interest in the
contract not having been breached by the slave in this way. The un-
dertaker's liability will be unlimited, provided the slave was acting
within the terms of his appointment (praepositio).
On the other hand, the liability of the undertaker to the delictual
actions arises in principle only in the event that the slave is in his po-
testas; and his liability is limited by the opportunity for noxal surren-
der and so by the value of the slave. Equally, liability arises not
because the slave was acting in the course of his duties, as a cleaner of
corpses, but because the slave was the property of the undertaker.
This case, therefore, displays two different models of limiting vicarious
liability: (i) in delict, liability is founded on potestas and limited nox-
ally; (ii) in contract, liability is founded on praepositio and unlimited
within its terms. 51
When we turn to Pothier, however, we find that rather than keep-
ing these two models of vicarious liability distinct and separate, he has
merged them and appropriated the text for the new purpose of sug-
gesting that delictual liability for others also is subject to the limitation
that it should have occurred within the terms of the employee's ap-
pointment. Voet does the same. In his discussion of the actio in-
stitoria, referred to earlier,52 he deals with the text immediately
following, where a baker sends his slave to sell bread, and the slave
49. Cf D. 14.3.5.10, where in the event of a breach of a warranty given by the conductor as
to the reliability of his employees, the conductor is personally liable.
50. Quasi because the slave is appointed for a single act rather than placed in charge of a
business? Or, because there is no real business (negotiatio, quaestus)? Or, because the delictual
act is not connected with the scope of the institor's business? See N. Benke, (1988) 105 SZ 592-
633 at 605 with further literature.
51. Cf. D. 14.1.1.2 where in another context the need to keep contractual and delictual
heads of liability distinct is asserted.
52. Voet, Commentarius 14.3.4.
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takes advance payments for bread from customers. Then, the slave
embezzles the money and absconds,53 and the baker is liable. This
text is used to support the proposition that a principal is liable for the
delicts of his institor within the scope of his appointment. But, even if
one accepts that the text is concerned with liability for the delict of
theft committed in the scope of an appointment as institor, there is
again no reason why the liability should be thought to be anything
other than a noxal liability in delict that arises regardless whether the
slave was an institor.54 Similar objections apply to other authorities
cited in support of the proposition. A glance at those authorities con-
veys the clear impression that some scraping of barrels was required in
order to come up with any textual support at all.55
Thus, both Pothier and Voet redeploy the functional liability de-
veloped by the Roman jurists for the case of contractual agency in the
new context of liability for delicts committed by agents or servants. In
Roman law, principals were not liable for the delicts of their free
agents; now they are liable for them within the scope of their appoint-
ment. In Roman law, fathers and slave owners were liable noxally for
the delicts of their children and slaves in general; now, noxal surren-
der being obsolete, there is a tendency to restrict that general liability,
sometimes using the notion of the scope of their appointment. 56 At
least in some jurisdictions, the extension of the liability for independ-
ent persons, and the contraction of liability for dependent persons,
come to turn on the same question of fact: whether the person was
acting in the scope of an appointment, and what the terms of that
appointment were. The approach to the question whether a person is
53. D. 14.3.5.9. This is in fact not quite clear on the text: the word conturbaverit may mean
simply that the slave goes bankrupt, but Voet glosses it id est decoxerit, making it clear that he is
thinking of theft by the slave.
54. The text expressly says that the institor is servus suus.
55. The following passages are referred to by Voet (cf. notes 38 and 40): (i) D. 39.4.12.1-2
appears to be concerned with an owner's liability for his own slaves; D. 39.4.1 pr. and 6 may go
beyond that and provide some support for the proposition; but the context, as Voet notes else-
where (Commentarius 39.4.19) is a very special one; (ii) in D. 9.2.27.9 the question of fault in
choosing suitable employees is raised in the contractual context; nothing is said to suggest that
liability for delict committed by a slave should be anything other than noxal; (iii) in C. 9.27.1
(382) the concern is with criminal liability at public law; (iv) so too in D. 48.3.14 pr.; (v) D. 4.9.7
pr., 4 and 6 and D. 47.5.1 are concerned with the special case of shipowners, innkeepers etc.,
already discussed in note 33 above.
56. Various different rules being attested, this is subject to qualification: Pothier draws a
distinction between slaves and children, making it an additional requirement for a father (but
not a master) to be liable that he should have been able to prevent the delict (Op. cit. (note 47),
§ 456); Voet, on the other hand, speaks of liability in full (in solidum) for children and servants
only in the scope of their appointment; otherwise the liability is limited to wages due, a test not
always of obvious utility for children (Op. cit., 9.4.10).
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liable for the delicts of others moves away from a noxal liability de-
pendent on status to a liability turning on the terms of a contractual
appointment. In short, it is an illustration of Sir Henry Maine's well-
known dictum that "the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from status to contract." 57
These considerations have played their part in the formation of
the French Civil Code.5 8 The precise origin of the rules governing the
liability in delict of mattres and commettans for their prdposs is some-
what obscure.5 9 Two reasons for the master's liability given by the
drafters of the Code are: his presumed fault in choosing the delin-
quent domestic or prgpos6, and poor supervision. 6° The original draft
for the Code allowed the employer to escape liability by proof of dili-
gence and lack of opportunity to prevent the harm.61 But, this clause
was rejected, apparently on the view that it was right that a master
should bear the consequences of the harmful acts of those from whom
he profits. Moreover, this view was already the solution of the
"ancien Droit."62 It should be noted, however, that this rationale-
that the taking of benefits should involve the bearing of burdens-is
precisely that given in the Roman sources for the contractual (rather
than delictual) liability of the principal for his institor.63
Accordingly, Domat's concerns were not with the principal's
functionally limited liability in the sphere of delict. Nor does it seem
probable that he provoked a confusion of principles and ideas be-
tween delict and contractual agency, as has been suggested.64 Instead,
the fact that both Pothier and Voet argue for the same type of limita-
tion of vicarious liability in delict strongly suggests a deliberate manip-
ulation of the Roman sources to achieve ends thought to be socially
and legally desirable. Indeed, the Roman texts on delict provided lit-
tle assistance in achieving these ends. But, the notion of praepositio,
which had been developed with some sophistication in Roman law,
provided an elegant solution, and one which was not burdened with
57. H. Maine, Ancient law (8th ed., London, 1880) 170.
58. Art. 1384 al. 5.
59. H. and L. Mazeaud and A. Tunc, Traiti thiorique et pratique de la responsabilit civile
ddlictuelle et contractuelle (6th. ed., Paris, 1965) vol. I p. 941 para. 857.
60. A. Colin and H. Capitant, Cours dl1mentaire de droit civil frangais (8th ed., Paris, 1935)
vol. II p. 198 para. 210.
61. J.G. Locr6, La Idgislation civile commerciale et criminelle de la France (Paris, 1827) vol.
13 p. 25. (The due diligence defense is part of German law: BGB para. 831.)
62. Colin and Capitant, ibid.; Domat, op. cit (note 42) 1.16.3 no. 1; Pothier, op. cit (note 47)
para. 456 and Traitd du Contrat de louage (Oeuvres vol. VIII) 193; F. Bouron, Le droit commun
de la France et la coutume de Paris (Paris, 1770) 6.3.1 no. 3 (ChAtelet de Paris).
63. D. 14.3.1 pr.: sicut commoda sentimus ita obligamur.
64. Planiol, op. cit. (note 41) 292.
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notions of status that belonged to a bygone age. That this notion had
been developed for application in an entirely different context was of
no significance when the balance for-or against-its application was
weighed.
B. Public and International Law and the Functional Limit
The functional limit can also be detected in public and interna-
tional law. In book three of his De iure belli ac pacis, Grotius raises
the question of the authority of generals (duces) in war to bind the
state (summa potestas). He argues that states can be bound by gener-
als' actions where there has been either an express statement of such
intent by the summa potestas, or intent can be gathered from the prae-
positio. The same distinction is later made, in different words, be-
tween what is regarded as falling within the terms of the office and,
beyond that, what is within the terms of a particular praepositio which
is known publicly, or at least to those concerned in the matter.65 Gro-
tius even relies on arguments based on the actio institoria: he con-
cludes that some nations are bound to a greater, some to a lesser,
degree by the acts of their leaders, according to how far their laws and
institutions are known to the other side. This argument is based di-
rectly on Ulpian's discussion of the principal's power to exclude or
limit liability for his institor by express notice to parties contracting
with him.66
This general line of argument is taken over by Christian Wolff
and developed in both his Ius naturae67 and Ius gentium methodo
scientifica pertractatum.68 In the 1us gentium, Wolff essentially applies
to public or international questions notions which he has developed in
a private law context in the 1us naturae. Since, he says, promises made
through an agent have been dealt with there, the same can be applied
to the promises of minor powers in war.69 These are the principles of
mandate, of the contractus institorius, and of the contractus ex-
ercitorius. If the supreme power expressly mandates something to a
minor power, or allows it by the law of war, the minor power is either
in the position of a mandatary, so far as a certain function is mandated
65. Op. cit., 3.22.2. The distinction seems similar to that between the ostensible and actual
authority of an agent.
66. Op. cit., 3.22.4, citing D. 14.3.5.11 and 11.2-4.
67. Ed. used: Hildesheim, 1972 repr. of ed. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1740.
68. Ed. used: Oxford, 1934 repr. of ed. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1764.
69. Para. 772; minor powers (potestates minores) are defined in para. 368 as persons who
have a certain authority deriving from, and exercised in the name of, the supreme powers (sum-
mae potestates); the summae potestates are defined there as those qui summum imperium habent.
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to him, or beyond the prescribed office, so far as he is obliged to do
certain things or not to do them, he is in the position of an institor or
exercitor.70 Accordingly, any promise made by a minor power without
a mandate, or beyond the limits of mandate, or the function mandated
to him or the office prescribed by law, is only a pact; it is to be com-
pared with the actions of the mandatary extra limites mandati and the
institor and exercitor extra fines praepositionis vel legem.
This brief discussion demands little summing up. Doctrine from
Roman private law is transposed into questions of public law with
some attention to detail. In short, the notion of praepositio, devel-
oped in a narrow context by the Roman jurists, had the capacity for a
remarkable future in areas that they would never have thought to ap-
ply it.
C. The Law of Contract and the Financial Limit
While the functional limit familiar to the actiones exercitoria and
institoria colonized the law of delict, and elsewhere, in the law of con-
tract attention turned to establishing financial limits on a principal's
liability. The problem appears to have been felt particularly in con-
nection with the actio exercitoria (although this impression may be in
some measure due to the maritime concerns of the Dutch jurists). As
previously discussed, Grotius thought the actio exercitoria a most un-
healthy innovation of Roman law that accorded neither with natural
equity nor with public utility. Its offense against public utility was that
it imposed joint and several liability on each of several owners of a
ship, and that it set no financial limit on liability. This unlimited liabil-
ity deterred men from owning ships for fear of liability quasi in infin-
itum for the actions of their captains. Indeed, because of this fear,
Holland applied a different rule, one that limited liability to the value
of a ship and its cargo (ad aestimationem navis et eorum quae in navi
sunt).7 1 The same criticisms are to be found in Voet's commentary,
where he notes that, contrary to the Roman rule, in modem practice
each of several exercitores is liable only for his own share on the con-
tracts made by the ship's captain. Furthermore, the exercitor can be
relieved of all debts arising from the captain's contracts if he is willing
to cede his whole share, and all rights which he has in the ship, includ-
ing its equipment, to the creditor; for it was thought excessively harsh
70. Para. 773; it should be noted that Wolff uses the term exercitor as parallel to institor and
therefore as referring to the agent rather than the principal, not the Roman usage.
71. H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis 2.11.13. He makes the same point in his Inleiding tot
de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyd (ed. Lee, 1953) 3.1.31-2.
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that one person should be liable for the contract or actions of another
beyond what he had entrusted to his responsibility or care. 72 Voet
also cites policy reasons for this limit: people should not be deterred
from maritime trade by a potentially infinite liability, such as might
arise through a captain who had long concealed his lack of morals, but
then fraudulently dissipated money.
73
By analogy with the case of the exercitor, where there are several
principals of a business, each is liable for the actions of the institor
only up to his own share;74 and a principal may rid himself of an obli-
gation arising from his institor's contract by ceding to the creditors
whatever he has entrusted to the management of the institor.75 This
rule is said to be established in practice (usu receptum). Accordingly,
a principal can now limit his liability to the amount that he has in-
vested in it, in any kind of business.
With the advent of a strict financial limit, it is interesting to note
that the extensive duty of inquiry placed by Roman law on those deal-
ing with a ship's captain can be abandoned. Voet notes that now the
only requirements are that one should, knowing someone to be a
ship's captain, lend money to him as such in good faith for the pur-
poses of navigation, and not laboring, under supina ignorantia.76 Voet
states that the reason this requirement suffices is: (i) because the lia-
bility of the exercitor is no longer unlimited, but limited by the value
of the ship and its equipment; (ii) because few people know what
manner, quantity, size, and nature of equipment is necessary for any
given ship, and few will lend to a ship's captain if they have to know it;
and (iii) because the greater fault rests with the exercitor for ap-
pointing a cheat as a captain. 77 The most substantial of these reasons
is surely the first, the second and third going essentially to policy. In-
deed, it is right that there should be a relationship between the liabil-
ity to which someone is exposed, and the terms on which he is
exposed to it. Thus, there is a counterpoint between the financial and
the functional limits.
72. Voet, Commentarius 14.1.5: dum durum nimis creditum, ex alieno alium contractu
factove teneri ultra id, quod ejus fidei curaeque permisit.
73. Ibid.
74. Voet, Commentarius 14.3.2, citing Grotius, Inleiding (note 71) 3.1.39 (should be 3.1.31);
Antonius Matthaeus, de auctionibus (ed. used: M. Parys, Antwerp, 1680) 1.5.8; cf. also Voet at
14.4.7.
75. Ibid., citing Simon van Leeuwen, Censura forensis theoretico-practica (ed. used: Gelder,
Leiden, 1678) part 1.4.3.10.




The most interesting assertion made by Voet, however, is that it
would be harsh to find a principal liable beyond his investment in the
business. This idea is reminiscent of Gaius' justification for noxal lia-
bility. Other authors also make the same point.78 Donellus writes
that "it is unfair for us to be liable on account of our property beyond
its value," and that this principle applies to damage caused by animals,
damage caused by slaves, and to damage caused by the collapse of a
building.79 These remarks, however, were made in the context of de-
lict. What is new in Voet's discussion is the notion that this idea
should be extended to business, and therefore, to liability arising from
contracts made in that business. If it is right to see in this a reminis-
cence of noxal liability, then it is striking that that notion has been
detached from all consideration of status, and has emerged as an ab-
stract rule: there should be an equivalence between the value of the
property and the owner's liability arising from it. Once that abstract
rule has been arrived at, it is amenable to wide application. It does
indeed seem to justify an owner in simply walking away from his prop-
erty, whether a house, a ship, or a business, and relinquishing all liabil-
ity, leaving the creditors to satisfy themselves from whatever the value
of the property may be.
What is also striking in these arguments about the limits on con-
tractual liability is that no use is made of the idea of peculium. There,
it might be thought, ready made, was the concept of a limited fund
ripe for adoption. The reason for this neglect is far from clear. It may
be that here the dissociation of the notion of peculium from the status
(slave, child in power) with which it was associated in Roman law was
not achieved. But that does not explain why not. It is possible that
the fact that the paterfamilias remained owner of the peculium, the
special position that arose from that fact, and the resulting complexity
of the Roman rules for calculating the value of the peculium net of all
sums due to a slave's owner, were thought unhelpful and inappropri-
ate. Thus, the Digest provided too many texts that might be hostages
to fortune for any attempt to establish clear limits on liability. Conse-
quently, it was safer to resort to a system in which the principal's lia-
bility could be more readily measured by the value of the business.
78. Cf Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis 2.17.21, who states that noxal liability is a matter of
the ius civile, there being by nature no liability on an owner who is not at fault.
79. H. Donellus, Commentarii iuris civilis (ed. used: Opera omnia, Florence, 1840-47)
15.51.4: non enim aequum est nos ex rebus nostris ultra earum aestimationem onerari, citing D.
9.1.1; D. 39.2.7.1 (where in particular the connection with pauperies and damnum infectum is
brought out); D. 9.4.2 pr. and Inst. 4.8.
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VII. SoME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Most of the Roman rules on limiting vicarious liability depended
on consideration of status. In contract, the financial limit of the pecu-
lium depended on the existence of a relationship of status between
owner and slave, or father and child, and on rules about valuation of
the peculium, which reflected rules about ownership that were them-
selves dependent on status. In delict, the financial limit supplied by
noxa also depended on status, and the relationship of owner and slave
and father and child. The exception to the status-based approach of
Roman law was the contractual model instanced by the actiones in-
stitoria and exercitoria. Yet, the model of vicarious liability that was
limited only by function, and not by amount, could work successfully
only if the function was interpreted with extreme stringency; arguably
with stringency of an impracticable degree. Therefore, in the later tra-
dition of Roman law, application of any of these regimes of limited
liability to societies quite different in structure was not straightfor-
ward: a pure functional limit in contract posed practical problems;
while the financial limits known to the Romans were tied to statuses
which no longer existed in the same form.
In the law of contract, disquiet was felt about a liability for others
which was limited only functionally-not by amount. A strict finan-
cial limit seemed simpler. Yet, for some reason the peculium-based
limit on liability did not seem attractive; perhaps because it brought
with it too much inconvenient textual baggage. It seemed reasonable
that liability should not exceed the value of the principal's investment
in the business. That principle was the modem version of the Roman
principle of noxal surrender; the idea behind it was the simple but
abstract one that an owner's liability should not exceed the value of
the property from which it arose. This view had the attraction of sup-
plying a clear limit on liability; with that once established, a corre-
sponding relaxation of the rigors of the functional limit on liability was
possible.
Delictual liability, on the other hand, needed to be limited some-
how since noxal surrender had disappeared. The best model that
presented itself existed in the Roman law of contract, where the func-
tional limit could be adopted with little trouble other than that of find-
ing some textual justification for the change, and where it would serve
without importing inconvenient rules depending on status.
This evolution illustrates a number of general propositions. First,
in their impact on other societies, legal ideas based on contract are as
1995]
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a rule more potent than those based on status-but even from ideas
based originally on status, abstract principles can be derived with po-
tential for the future. Second, the potency of a legal idea need bear
little relation to the context in which it was originally developed. In
the present case, the striking feature is a wholesale redeployment of
the Roman rules. The law of contract supplied a mode of limiting
liability that was to become absolutely fundamental in the modern law
of delict; while the law of delict contained the germ of a concept that
bore fruit in the modem law of contract.80
80. I am grateful to Peter Stein for commenting on a draft of this paper.
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